















Resumo		Este	 ensaio	 analisa	 o	 princípio	 da	 autodeterminação	 dos	 povos	 contido	 na	Carta	das	Nações	Unidas.	Usando	os	métodos	 tradicionais	de	 interpretação	de	 tratados,	 argumenta	 que	 a	 Carta,	 por	 si	 só,	 não	 garante	 o	 direito	 à	autodeterminação	 de	 entidades	 específicas	 de	 uma	 maneira	 particular.	 A	Carta	 apenas	 consagra	 um	 princípio	 jurídico	 que	 posteriormente	 foi	traduzido	 em	 normas	 específicas	 por	 tratados	 sucessivos	 e	 pelo	 direito	consuetudinário.	 Por	 outro	 lado,	 a	 Carta	 não	 limita	 o	 escopo	 da	autodeterminação	ao	contexto	colonial	ou	a	populações	 inteiras	de	Estados	soberanos.	 Portanto,	 e	 como	 o	 princípio	 não	 implica	 independência,	 a	autodeterminação	 poderia	 muito	 bem	 ser	 aplicada	 a	 vários	 grupos	 não	estatais,	como	já	aconteceu	no	caso	dos	povos	indígenas.	
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Abstract	This	 essay	 analyses	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 of	 peoples	 as	contained	 in	 the	 Charter	 of	 the	 United	 Nations.	 Using	 the	 traditional	methods	of	 treaty	 interpretation,	 it	 argues	 that	 the	Charter	does	not	 in	itself	 guarantee	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 of	 specific	 entities	 in	 a	particular	way.	The	Charter	merely	 enshrines	 a	 legal	 principle	 that	has	subsequently	been	translated	into	particular	norms	by	successive	treaties	and	 customary	 law.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Charter	 does	 not	 limit	 the	scope	 of	 self-determination	 to	 the	 colonial	 context	 or	 to	 entire	populations	of	 sovereign	states.	Therefore,	 and	since	 the	principle	does	




not	 imply	 independence,	 self-determination	 could	 well	 be	 applied	 to	various	 non-state	 groups,	 as	 has	 already	 happened	 in	 the	 case	 of	indigenous	peoples.	
Keywords:	Self-Determination,	People,	Charter	of	the	United	Nations.		 	
Introduction		 Peoples	have	the	right	to	self-determination.	A	principle	invoked	by	the	winners	of	both	world	wars	when	considering	the	post-war	arrangement	of	the	world	(Wilson	and	Shaw,	1918;	Atlantic	Charter,	1941).	A	principle	that	contributed	to	the	collapse	of	colonies	(UNGA	Resolution	1514).	A	principle	behind	the	bloodiest	European	war	conflict	 in	 the	second	half	of	 the	twentieth	century	(Detrez,	 2003).	 And	 recently	 also	 a	 principle	 associated	 with	 the	 rights	 of	 indigenous	 peoples	(UNGA	Resolution	61/295).	There	 is	 no	 doubt	 about	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 of	 peoples	 in	international	 law.	 It	 is	enshrined	in	 international	treaties	and	other	documents	and	is	taken	into	account	 by	 states	 in	 both	 international	 relations	 and	 national	 matters.	 It	 is	 also	 dealt	 with	 by	international	tribunals	and	academic	texts.	Yet	the	subject	of	self-determination	of	peoples	is	one	of	the	most	controversial	ones.	In	 the	 first	 place,	 this	 is	 because	 it	 contains	 two	 vague	 terms:	 “self-determination”	 and	“people”.	 This	 alone	 may	 not	 be	 an	 insurmountable	 obstacle;	 after	 all,	 lawyers	 are	 commonly	confronted	with	vague	terms	and	deal	with	them	using	traditional	interpretation	methods.	In	the	case	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 of	 peoples,	 however,	 the	 situation	 is	 more	 difficult	because	 the	 principle	 has	 become	 part	 of	 international	 law	without	 a	 general	 consensus	 on	 its	meaning.	 It	 can	 even	 be	 said	 that	 self-determination	 has	 become	 part	 of	 international	 law	 not	despite	its	uncertainty	but	thanks	to	it	because	it	has	always	allowed	interpretations	that	limit	the	interests	of	states	concerned	as	least	as	possible.	It	is	not	surprising,	therefore,	that	international	treaties	 and	 other	 instruments	 that	 enshrine	 the	 right	 of	 peoples	 to	 self-determination	 do	 not	contain	any	definition	of	‘people’	and	merely	elaborate	on	what	self-determination	means.	The	practice	of	states	is	not	much	better.	It	is	quite	clear	in	the	colonial	context2	or	in	the	case	of	occupied	territories	(International	Court	of	Justice,	2004,	paras.	115	et	seq.).	However,	in	relation	to	the	right	to	self-determination	of	the	population	(or	part	of	it)	of	a	sovereign	state,	states	are	far	less	consistent.		
Self-Determination	of	Peoples	and	the	Role	of	United	Nations		 In	 2008,	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (hereinafter	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 “Court”)	was	asked	by	the	UN	General	Assembly	to	assess	whether	the	declaration	of	independence	by	Kosovo	representatives	 was	 in	 accordance	 with	 international	 law,	 which	 provided	 an	 exceptional	opportunity	 for	states	 to	present	 their	 interpretation	of	 the	right	 to	self-determination	 in	a	non-colonial	 context	 (although	 the	Opinion	 itself	 avoided	 interpretation	of	 self-determination;	 paras.	82-83).	A	look	at	the	various	submissions	sent	to	the	Court	by	various	states	showed	an	incredible	




fragmentation	 of	 opinions.3	Different	 attitudes	were	 held	 not	 only	with	 respect	 to	what	 follows	from	the	right	to	self-determination	but	also	with	respect	to	who	can	enjoy	that	right.		For	example,	China,	Romania,	Serbia,	Cyprus,	Argentina	and,	 to	some	extent,	Bolivia	and	the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	stated	that	Kosovo	did	not	have	the	right	to	self-determination.	In	contrast,	Switzerland,	Finland,	Slovenia,	Ireland,	Denmark,	Maldives,	Egypt,	Germany,	Poland,	Estonia,	Latvia,	Albania	and	the	Netherlands	were	of	the	opposite	opinion	(and	even	 these	 countries	 did	 not	 agree	 on	 particulars).	 Russia,	 Slovakia,	 Spain	 and	 Japan	 openly	admitted	 that	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Kosovo	was	questionable.	The	divergence	of	views	on	the	right	to	self-determination	was	reflected	in	the	Opinion	itself	and	 in	 the	 separate	opinions	of	 the	Court’s	 judges.	As	 the	Court	pointed	out,	 “radically	different	views”	were	expressed	with	respect	to	the	question	whether	the	right	to	self-determination	confers	upon	part	of	the	population	of	an	existing	state	a	right	to	separate	from	that	state	(para.	82).	Judge	Cançado	Trindade	has	stated	in	this	respect	that	the	meaning	of	the	term	“people”	in	the	context	of	the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 several	 debates	 that	 have	 not	 lead	 to	unambiguous	conclusions.4	Judge	Yusuf	criticised	the	Court	for	missing	the	opportunity	to	interpret	the	right	to	self-determination	and	thereby	prevent	many	disputes	around	the	world	(para.	17).	Every	case	is	unique	and	it	is	precisely	the	specificity	of	Kosovo	that	many	states	have	pointed	out.	Law,	however,	does	not	operate	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	The	differences	in	the	interpretation	of	law	and	 its	application	 to	a	particular	case	are	natural.	However,	 in	 the	case	of	 the	right	 to	self-determination—as	presented	in	the	above-mentioned	written	opinions—one	can	no	longer	speak	about	an	ordinary	dispute	about	law	but	almost	about	chaos.	This	 leads	 the	 author	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 subject	 the	principle	 of	 self-determination	to	new	examination,	focusing	gradually	on	its	original	enshrinement	in	international	law	 and	 on	 the	 subsequent	 development.	 This	 examination	 should	 not	 be	 based	 on	 political	 or	other	 considerations	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 but	strictly	on	the	relevant	(especially	primary)	sources	of	international	law	as	enshrined	in	Art.	38	(1)	of	the	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice.5		The	author	considers	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	to	be	a	starting	point,	which	integrated	this	principle,	previously	merely	political,6	into	its	Art.	1	(2).7	It	was	precisely	the	principle	of	self-determination	 as	 contained	 in	 the	 Charter	 that	 was	 subsequently	 followed	 by	 state	 practice,	including	 international	 treaties.8	 The	 primary	 and	 crucial	 question	 for	 this	 article	 is	 what	 the	Charter	actually	enshrined.	Its	clarification	will	make	it	possible	to	follow	up	with	further	research,	focused	especially	on	customary	law	as	it	developed	based	on	the	Charter	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	and	early	twenty-first	centuries.		











or	even	in	the	Preamble	to	the	Charter	did	not	appear	to	be	crucial	and	was	not	based	on	criteria	that	could	be	clearly	grasped	(Cristescu,	1981,	p.	21	et	seq.).	In	any	case,	it	is	inevitable	to	insist	on	the	conclusion	that	self-determination	of	peoples	in	the	Charter	 is	 merely	 a	 legal	 principle	 that	 should	 be	 further	 specified	 by	 the	 activities	 of	 the	organization	bodies	and	its	members.	This	is	also	confirmed	by	information	from	the	preparatory	works.	It	shows	that	initially,	self-determination	of	peoples	was	not	to	appear	in	the	Charter	at	all,	which	 changed	 only	 at	 the	 insistence	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 (Cassese,	 1995,	 p.	 38).	 Some	 states	continued	 to	 demand	 that	 it	 be	 removed	 because	 of	 its	 ambiguity,	 but	 the	 principle	 ultimately	remained	 in	 the	 final	 text;	however,	without	 further	 specification	or	 finding	a	 certain	consensus	over	what	it	should	express.	As	the	San	Francisco	conference	report	says,	“states	were	unable	to	
positively	define	 self-determination”.	Allegedly,	 it	was	only	agreed	that	self-determination	under	Art.	1	(2)	did	not	mean	the	right	of	minorities	and	ethnic	groups	to	separate	from	a	sovereign	state,	the	right	of	colonies	to	gain	independence,	or	the	right	of	residents	of	a	sovereign	state	to	choose	their	 rulers	 through	 regular,	 democratic	 and	 free	 elections	 (Cassese,	 1995,	 p.	 42).	 If	 it	 was	ultimately	agreed	to	retain	the	mention	of	the	principle	of	self-determination	in	the	Charter	without	having	 reached	agreement	on	 its	 contents,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 it	was	done	so	with	 the	knowledge	of	absence	of	particular	rights	arising	out	of	it.		For	these	reasons,	the	author	considers	irrelevant	the	difference	between	the	English	version	(and	also,	for	example,	the	Spanish	version)	and	the	French	version	consisting	in	the	fact	that	while	the	English	version	does	not	present	self-determination	of	peoples	as	a	right	(“…based	on	respect	
for	the	principle	of	equal	rights	and	self-determination	of	peoples…”),	the	French	version	does	when	stipulating	the	principle	of	right	 to	self-determination	(“…sur	 le	respect	du	principe	de	 l'égalité	de	




identifiable	time	at	which	the	word	was	used	in	the	present	meaning,	include,	for	example,	all	voters	in	a	state	or	a	body	of	persons	that	are	united	by	a	common	culture,	tradition,	or	sense	of	 kinship,	 that	 typically	 have	 common	 language,	 institutions,	 and	 beliefs,	 and	 that	 often	constitute	a	politically	organized	group	(Merriam-Webster,	“people”).	A	 look	 at	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	 Charter	 shows	 that	 “nation”	 and	 “state”	 are	 used	 in	addition	 to	 “people”,	 sometimes	 even	 in	 the	 same	 sentence.	Therefore,	 it	 should	a	priori	 be	assumed	 that	 these	 words	 have	 different	 meanings	 (Scalia	 and	 Garner,	 2002,	 p.	 170).	 The	word	 “people”	 has	 a	 total	 of	 thirteen	 mentions	 in	 the	 Charter,11	 in	 various,	 at	 first	 glance	unrelated	provisions.	For	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 introductory	sentence	of	 the	Preamble,	which	starts	with	 the	words	 “we	 the	 peoples	 of	 the	 United	Nations”.	 In	 the	 Preamble,	 “people”	 is	used	 once	 more	 in	 the	 context	 of	 promoting	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 advancement	 of	 all	peoples.	 In	nine	cases,	 “people”	 is	used	 in	provisions	applicable	 to	colonies	and,	 finally,	 two	cases	of	use	are	the	currently	discussed	Art.	1	(2)	and	Art.	55.		The	word	“state”	is	used	much	more	frequently	in	the	Charter	and	there	are	no	disputes	over	 its	 meaning,	 it	 is	 a	 traditional	 subject	 of	 international	 law	 that	 has	 a	 permanent	population,	government	and	territory,	and	the	ability	to	enter	 into	diplomatic	relations	with	other	states.12	Nor	is	there	any	major	controversy	that	there	are	obvious	differences	between	the	 concepts	 of	 “state”	 and	 “people”.	 More	 problematic	 is	 the	 word	 “nation”	 and	 its	differentiation	 from	the	other	 two	 terms.	At	 first	glance,	 “nation”	 is	used	most	 frequently	 in	the	Charter.	A	closer	examination,	however,	reveals	that	these	are	mostly	situations	where	the	organization	is	mentioned	as	such.	The	word	“nation”	is	used	in	a	different	context	only	in	the	Preamble	 (which	 expresses	 belief	 in	 the	 equal	 rights	 of	 nations	 large	 and	 small),	 in	 Art.	1	(enshrining	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 organization)	 or	 in	 the	 phrase	 “friendly	 relations	 among	nations”	 (in	Art.	1,	Art.	14	and	Art.	55).	The	 term	“nation”	generally	has	a	different	meaning	than	 “state”,	 for	 example	 in	 that	 it	 captures	 a	 certain	 “living”	 element	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	concept	of	“state”,	which	is	a	legal	construction.	According	to	the	aforementioned	Black’s	Law	Dictionary,	it	is	an	organized	people	inhabiting	a	distinct	portion	of	the	earth,	using	the	same	customs,	 possessing	 historic	 continuity,	 and	 generally,	 but	 not	 necessarily,	 living	 under	 the	same	 government	 and	 sovereignty	 (The	 Law	Dictionary,	 “nation”).	Here,	 therefore,	 it	might	seem	to	be	a	subset	of	“people”,	which	does	not,	however,	clearly	explain	why	the	word	was	used	 at	 all,	 since	 surely	 if	 it	 was	 only	 a	 subset,	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 organization	 would	 be	friendship	among	all	peoples,	not	only	nations.	Another	problem	with	the	term	“nation”	is	that	it	 should	 be	 different	 from	 “state”	 but	 the	 organization	 is	 called	 “the	 United	 Nations”,	 and	according	 to	 Art.	3	 and	 4,	 only	 states	 can	 be	members.13	 The	 explanation	 could	 be	 that	 the	organization	unites	 nations	 through	 states	 as	 their	 international	 representatives.	Moreover,	there	 are	 other	 than	 (only)	 linguistic	 requirements	 for	 names.	 Also	 important	 is	 certain	symbolism	(in	 this	case	 the	name	 follows	up	on	 the	name	of	 the	winning	coalition	 from	the	WWII)	 or	 unmistakeability	 (hence	 the	 name	 “the	 United	 States”	 would	 be	 unfit).	 This,	however,	does	not	eliminate	other	ambiguities.		States	 pointed	 out	 these	 shortcomings	 during	 the	 San	 Francisco	 Conference.	 Their	representatives	argued	that	the	term	“nation”	was	confusing	and	legally	incorrect	since	only	states	are	subjects	of	international	relations,	that	the	use	of	the	terms	“nation”	and	“people”	in	a	single	sentence	indicates	the	possibility	of	separation,	or	that	the	terms	“nation”	and	“state”	are	used	interchangeably	in	some	countries,	whereas	in	Europe	there	is	a	difference	between	












In	addition	to	'self-determination',	the	Charter	uses	the	concepts	of	“self-government”	and	“independence”.	On	the	basis	of	the	same	thought	process	used	for	the	word	“people”,	 it	can	be	 stated	 that	 self-determination	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 independence	 or	 self-government.	Independence	 cannot	 be	 even	 considered	 the	 only	 possible	 way	 of	 self-determination.	 The	word	“independence”	is	used	twice	in	the	Charter;	in	the	aforementioned	Art.	2	(4)	(referring	to	 the	 threat	 for	 the	 political	 independence	 of	 a	 state)	 and	 especially	 in	 Art.	76,	 which	stipulates	 that	 one	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 trusteeship	 system	 is	 “to	 promote	 the	 political,	
economic,	 social,	 and	 educational	 advancement	 of	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 trust	 territories,	 and	
their	progressive	development	towards	self-government	or	independence	as	may	be	appropriate	
to	the	particular	circumstances	of	each	territory	and	its	peoples	and	the	freely	expressed	wishes	




introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 gradual	 shift	 towards	 a	 full	measure	of	 self-government,	which	can	be	achieved	in	three	ways:	the	creation	of	a	sovereign	independent	state,	free	association	with	an	independent	state	and	integration	into	another	independent	state.	The	choice	among	these	variants	should	be	based	on	the	freely	expressed	wishes	of	the	people.	Independence	as	an	 objective	 of	 territory	 administration	 under	 Art.	73	 and	76	 was	 also	 confirmed	 by	 the	International	Court	of	Justice	(1971,	para.	52).	However,	 contrary	 to	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 word	 “people”,	 this	 practice	 cannot	 be	regarded	 merely	 a	 clarification	 of	 the	 original	 meaning	 of	 the	 Charter.	 As	 shown	 above,	independence	 was	 not	 originally	 the	 objective	 of	 colonial	 territorial	 administration.	 It	 is,	therefore,	only	a	reflection	of	the	development	of	international	law	in	the	interpretation	of	the	treaty.	This	development,	 furthermore,	 does	not	 affect	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	principle	of	self-determination	in	general,	but	only	the	interpretation	of	the	self-determination	of	colonial	peoples.	In	relation	to	them,	there	is	no	doubt	that	self-determination	requires	independence.	However,	the	distinction	between	self-determination	and	independence	remains.		This	is	evidenced,	for	example,	by	recent	practice	in	relation	to	the	self-determination	of	indigenous	 peoples	 (see	 Anaya,	 2009,	 p.	 184).	 In	 2007,	 the	 General	 Assembly	 adopted	 a	resolution	accompanied	by	the	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	 Indigenous	Peoples	as	an	annex	(UNGA,	 Resolution	 61/295).	 In	 the	 latter,	 indigenous	 peoples	 were	 granted	 the	 status	 of	 a	people	 (which	 also	 confirms	 the	wider	meaning	 of	 the	 word	 above)	 with	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	(referring	to	the	principle	of	self-determination	under	the	Charter),	but	with	an	express	 exclusion	 of	 any	 impact	 on	 territorial	 integrity	 or	 political	 unity	 of	 states.	 The	Declaration	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 Indigenous	 Peoples	 is	 not	 binding,	 but	 has	 been	 adopted	 by	143	states	(the	107th	plenary	session	of	the	General	Assembly,	2007),14	thus	presenting	their	views	on	the	applicability	of	the	principle	of	self-determination.	It	 follows	 from	 all	 of	 the	 above	 that	 the	 Charter	 included	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 of	 peoples	 without	 specifying	 who	 has	 the	 status	 of	 a	 people	 and	 how	specifically	 its	self-determination	should	be	achieved.	It	was	a	vague	principle	left	to	further	development.	In	different	contexts	and	in	relation	to	different	entities,	it	can	be	projected	into	different	forms	of	its	implementation.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	colonies	it	was	first	a	certain	degree	 of	 self-government,	 subsequently	 independence.	 In	 relation	 to	 indigenous	 peoples,	independence	 is,	 in	 contrast,	 strictly	 excluded.	 As	 mentioned	 at	 the	 beginning,	 self-determination	of	other	entities	is	the	subject	to	debate.	
	
Conclusions		The	 conclusions	 drawn	 in	 this	 article	make	 it	 possible	 to	 streamline	 these	 discussions.	Just	as	self-determination	 in	contemporary	 international	 law	is	based	on	the	UN	Charter,	 its	applicability	 in	 individual	 contexts	 should	 be	 based	 on	 the	 conclusions	 of	 this	 article.	 This	means	 taking	 into	 account	 that	 self-determination	 as	 a	 principle	 is	 not	a	 priori	 limited	 to	 a	clearly	 defined	 group	 of	 entities,	 nor	 does	 it	 assume	 that	 each	 people	 will	 achieve	independence	 as	 part	 of	 self-determination.	 The	 latter	 fact	 should	 allow	 for	 the	 full	development	of	self-determination	as	a	principle	supporting	the	right	of	persons	to	decide	for	themselves	as	the	main	obstacle	has	always	been	states’	fear	of	territorial	integrity	violation.15	
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